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Abstract
We consider the problem of Oblivious Shuffling, a critical component in several applications in which
one wishes to hide the pattern of data access, and the problem of K-Oblivious Shuffling, a refinement
thereof. We provide efficient algorithms for both problems and discuss their application to the design
of Oblivious RAM. The task of a K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm is to obliviously shuffle N encrypted
blocks that have been randomly allocated on the server in such a way that an adversarial server learns
nothing about the new allocation of blocks. The security guarantee should hold also with respect to an
adversary that has learned the initial position of K touched blocks out of the N blocks. The classical
notion of Oblivious Shuffling is obtained for K = N .
We start by presenting a family of algorithms for Oblivious Shuffling. Our first construction, that
we call CacheShuffleRoot, is tailored for clients with O(
√
N) blocks of memory and uses (4 + )N blocks
of bandwidth, for every  > 0 and has negligible in N failure probability. CacheShuffleRoot is a 4.5x
improvement over the previous best known result on practical sizes of N . We also present CacheShuffle
that obliviously shuffles using O(S) blocks of client memory with O(N logS N) blocks of bandwidth.
We then turn to K-Oblivious Shuffling and give algorithms that require 2N + f(K) blocks of band-
width, for some function f . That is, any extra bandwidth above the 2N lower bound depends solely on K.
We present KCacheShuffleBasic that uses O(K) client storage and exactly 2N blocks of bandwidth. For
smaller client storage requirements, we show KCacheShuffle, which uses O(S) client storage and requires
2N + (1 + )O(K logS K) blocks of bandwidth.
Finally, motivated by applications to ORAM design, we consider also the case in which, in addition
to the N blocks, the server stores D dummy blocks whose content is is irrelevant but still their positions
must be hidden by the shuffling. For this case, we design algorithm KCacheShuffleDummy that, for N+D
blocks and K touched blocks, uses O(K) client storage and D + (2 + )N blocks of bandwidth.
We discuss how to use KCacheShuffleBasic and KCacheShuffleDummy to improve practical Oblivious
RAM constructions.
∗The first version of this report (May 19, 2017) described CacheShuffle and CacheShuffleRoot. The second version of
this report (September 5, 2017) introduced the concept of a K-Oblivious Shuffling and described KCacheShuffleBasic and
KCacheShuffleDummy. The current version describes KCacheShuffle.
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1 Introduction
Cloud storage has become an increasingly popular technology due to the many benefits it offers users.
Uploading files to the cloud allows users to share documents easily without incurring into bandwidth costs
or the annoyance of email attachments. Users are able to access documents from anywhere without having
to transfer data between machines. The burden of replicating data and recovering from machine failures is
placed on the storage provider. For many corporations, cloud storage becomes cost efficient since the price
of cloud storage may be cheaper than developing and maintaining their own internal storage systems.
Some users might want to hide the contents of their data from their cloud providers. A first attempt
would be to encrypt all documents by the client before uploading the files to the server. Work done in [12]
and [15] show that the access pattern to encrypted data may leak information to cloud storage providers.
Data oblivious algorithms and storage can be used to hide the access pattern to remote data with Oblivious
Random Access Memory (ORAM) being the primary example. ORAM was first introduced by [5] (see
also [6]) that introduced the so called Square Root ORAM (with a square root communication overhead
and client memory) and the Hierarchical ORAM construction which has poly-logarithmic amortized cost
and sublinear client storage. Recently, more practical constructions such as Path ORAM [22], Partition
ORAM [21] and Recursive Square Root ORAM [18] have appeared. The best known asymptotic results with
O(logN) amortized query cost with O(N ) blocks of client storage was first shown in [10]. The result was
improved to make the worst case also O(logN) in [9]. However, these asymptotic results have constants too
large to be considered practical at the moment.
Many ORAM constructions have amortized costs due to the need of periodically running an oblivious
shuffling algorithm. Roughly speaking, an oblivious shuffle moves around the data blocks in such a way that
the server cannot link together the position of a block before the shuffle with the position of the same block
after the shuffle. This is used to completely remove any links that the server might have created with the data
blocks in the position before the oblivious shuffle. Essentially, all extracted information is rendered useless.
This idea appeared in the original Square Root ORAM and Hierarchical ORAM that allowed clients to
perform accesses until a break point was reached where the server might be able to extract extra information
from the access pattern. At this point, the client performs an oblivious shuffle (after which, new queries
cannot provide extra information to the server), and queries can occur again.
The early approach to oblivious shuffling involved the use of sorting circuits (or of oblivious sorting
algorithms that can also be seen as sorting circuits). The client evaluates the compare-exchange gates one at
a time and for each gate it downloads the two encrypted blocks that are input to the gate, re-encrypts them
and uploads them in right order. Batcher’s sort is considered the most practical algorithm [2] even though it
has asymptotic cost of O(N log2N). Sorting networks such as AKS [1] and Zig-Zag [8] have O(N logN) size,
but are considered impractical due to large constants. Randomized Shellsort [7] has larger depth than AKS
but the constant hidden in the big Oh notation is smaller. Oblivious shuffling based on sorting circuits is
interesting because the client need only to store a constant number of data blocks but it requires bandwidth
proportional to the size of the network which is Ω(N logN). The first oblivious shuffling algorithm not
based on sorting circuits, the Melbourne Shuffle, was introduced in [16] and uses O(N) bandwidth while only
requiring O(
√
N) blocks to be stored on the client at any time.
Results and Contributions. In this paper, we present practical algorithms for oblivious shuffling.
We base our design on the following observation that has been overlooked by previous work. As we
have discussed, the main goal of oblivious shuffling is to make sure that the adversary cannot accumulate
too much information on which slot in server memory holds which block in algorithms that hide the access
pattern to data blocks. However, it is seldom the case that the adversary gets to learn the position of all the
N blocks but, rather, of a number of blocks that is equal to the size of the client memory. In addition, the
client knows exactly which blocks have been touched by the server. We call these blocks the touched blocks.
This is the case, for example, for the Square Root ORAM of [5, 6] and of its hierarchical versions. Motivated
by this observation, we introduce the concept of a K-Oblivious Shuffling Algorithm that reshuffles N data
blocks, K of which are touched. For K = N , the notions of a K-Oblivious Shuffling Algorithm coincides
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with the original notion of an Oblivious Shuffling Algorithm of [16].
Before tackling the problem of designing efficient K-Oblivious Shuffling Algorithms, we revisit the original
Oblivious Shuffling problem by providing improved algorithms. All our algorithms use a cache in client
memory to store blocks downloaded from the server before they can be uploaded to the server. The main
technical difficulty is to show that the cache does not grow too much. We first apply this design principle in
Section 4 by presenting an Oblivious Shuffling Algorithm, CacheShuffleRoot, that uses bandwidth (4 + )N
and client memory O(
√
N) and has negligible failure probability. For similar client memory usage and error
probability, Melbourne Shuffle [16] uses about 4 times more bandwidth. We generalize this construction to
CacheShuffle in Section 5 to any client memory S = ω(logN) in which case bandwidth is O(N logN/ logS)
and probability of failure is still negligible.
We then turn to the design ofK-Oblivious Shuffling Algorithms forK ≤ N . From a high level, the number
K of touched data blocks succinctly describes the difficulty of shuffling the specific data sets. In the extreme
case that no block has been disclosed (e.g., in an ORAM in which no query has been performed), clearly
no shuffle is required. On the other hand, if all blocks have been touched, then oblivious shuffling becomes
hardest. All previous oblivious shuffling algorithms have always considered the most difficult scenario and
have reshuffled so to guarantee security as if all the blocks had been touched, even if that was not the case
in the specific application. Our work is the first to separate the two problems. In Section 6, we give a
simple K-Oblivious Shuffling Algorithm KCacheShuffleBasic for the case in which client memory S ≥ K.
This setting is relevant to ORAM design and, for every K, we obtain an algorithm with bandwidth 2N . In
Section 7, we give, for every client memory S = ω(logN) and for every , algorithm KCacheShuffle that uses
bandwidth 2N + c · (1 + )K logS K, for constant c. For the special case of S =
√
K, we have algorithm
KCacheShuffleRoot that uses bandwidth 2N + (4 + )K. For every  > 0, the algorithms have negligible in
N abort probability.
Motivated by the problem of designing bandwidth efficient ORAM, in Section 8 we consider a scenario
in which there are D dummy blocks, which can be of arbitrary values, in addition to N real blocks. It is
possible to use any K-Oblivious Shuffling Algorithm in this scenario and just treat the dummy blocks as any
other block. By taking into account instead the fact that the content of the dummy blocks is irrelevant we
present algorithm KCacheShuffleDummy that has bandwidth of D+ 2(N + ) blocks for some small  > 0 for
the case in which S ≥ K. Applying directly KCacheShuffleBasic would result in bandwidth 2(N + D) and
so we are saving bandwidth corresponding to D blocks. The savings come at the cost of a small amount of
server computation,
In the table below, we compare our algorithms with the previous best algorithm for Oblivious Shuffling,
Melbourne Shuffle [16].
Client Storage Bandwidth
Melbourne Shuffle [16] O(
√
N) ≈ 18N
CacheShuffleRoot O(
√
N) (4 + )N
CacheShuffle O(S) O(N logS N)
KCacheShuffleBasic O(K) 2N
KCacheShuffleRoot O(
√
K) 2N + (4 + )K
KCacheShuffle O(S) 2N + (1 + )O(K logS K)
KCacheShuffleDummy O(K) D + (2 + )N
Figure 1: N denotes the number of blocks. Algorithm KCacheShuffleDummy receives D additional dummy
blocks, for a total of N +D blocks. Algorithm KCacheShuffleRoot is obtained from algorithm KCacheShuffle
by setting S =
√
N . For all algorithms, server storage is c ·N , for small constant c.
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2 Definitions
Our reference scenario is a cloud storage model with a client that wishes to outsource the storage of N data
blocks of identical sizes to a server that has storage of capacity M ≥ N . In this context, we consider the
problem of obliviously shuffling the data blocks.
We assume that the data blocks have been uploaded by the Setup algorithm that takes as input a
sequence B = (B1, . . . , BN ) of N data blocks of identical sizes B and a permutation pi : [N ] → [N ]. The
Setup algorithm randomly selects an encryption key key for a symmetric encryption scheme and uploads
the data blocks encrypted using key to the server by storing it in the first N locations of the server storage
according to pi; that is, if pi(i) = j ∈ [N ], an encrypted copy of the i-th data block is stored at the j-th
location of the server storage. Note that pi is a permutation and each of the N data blocks is uploaded
exactly once to the server.
Once the data has been uploaded, an adversary A is allowed to query for the position of a subset Touched
of the data blocks and for each queried block i, the value pi(i) is revealed to A. We call the data blocks in
Touched, the touched data blocks.
The Shuffling algorithm, instead, takes as input the encryption key key used to setup the N blocks, the
permutation map pi, the set Touched of touched data blocks and a new permutation σ. The task of the
Shuffling algorithm is to re-permute the N data blocks stored on the server according to permutation map
σ. At each step, the Shuffling algorithm can download a block i to client memory by specifying the block’s
current location on the server or upload a block from client memory to server memory by specifying its
destination on the server. In addition, the Shuffling algorithm can ask the server to perform operation on
locally stored data blocks. We are interested in oblivious Shuffling algorithms that, roughly speaking, have
the property of hiding information about the content of the data blocks and on σ, even to an adversarial
algorithm that has partial information on pi (the set Touched) and observes the blocks downloaded and
uploaded by the Shuffling algorithm.
The mechanics of the Shuffling algorithm. A Shuffling algorithm receives as input the initial permuta-
tion pi, the final permutation pi and the set Touched. The Shuffling algorithm proceeds in steps and each step
can be either a move step or a server computation step. The state after the q-th step is described by a server
allocation map ρq : [M ] → [N ] ∪ {⊥} and by a client allocation map Lq : [S] → [N ] ∪ {⊥}. Each allocation
map specify the block in each of the M server locations and S client locations, respectively. More precisely,
ρq(j) = i means that, after the q-th step is performed, the j-th server location contains an encryption of
the i-th data block. If instead ρq(j) =⊥, then an encryption of a dummy data block is stored at location j.
Note that, unlike permutations, the argument of an allocation map is an index of a slot in memory and its
value is a block index. Similarly statements are true for the client allocation map but Lq(j) =⊥ denotes an
empty client slot.
When a Shuffling algorithm starts, the server allocation map ρ0 coincides with permutation map pi on
the first N storage location of the M server memory locations and has dummy blocks on the remaining
N − M locations; that is, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , ρ0(i) = pi−1(i) and ρ0(i) =⊥, for i > N . Instead L0[i] =⊥
for all i ∈ [S] (that is, initially, no block is stored in the client’s local memory). At each step, a Shuffling
algorithm can perform either a move operation or a server computation operation. A move operation can be
either a download or an upload move and they modify the state as follows. If the q-th move is a download
move with source sq and destination dq, it has the effect of storing an encryption of block ρq−1(sq) stored at
server location sq at location Lq(dq) of the client memory; that is, the block at location sq on the server is
downloaded, decrypted using key and re-encrypted by using key and fresh randomness. As a consequence,
the server allocation map stays the same ρq := ρq−1 and Lq is the same as Lq−1 with the exception that
Lq(dq) = ρq−1(sq). If instead, the q-th move is an upload move with source sq and destination dq, it has
the effect of uploading the block in client location sl to server location dq; that is, the client allocation map
stays the same Sq := Sq−1 and ρq differs from ρq−1 only for the values at dq. Our algorithms will also use
special upload moves with sq =⊥ in which a dummy block (say, a block consisting of all 0’s) is uploaded
to server location dq. A server computation operation is instead specified by a circuit that takes as input
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a subset of the blocks and modifies the blocks stored at the server. As we shall see, this operation consists
of homomorphic operation on ciphertext and can be used to save bandwidth while requiring more server
computation. can also perform operations on blocks stored on the server in which case the length of the
description of the circuit describing the operation is added to the bandwidth. We compute the bandwidth of
a Shuffling algorithm using the block size B as a unit of measurement; thus bandwidth is simply the number
of move operations plus the size of the circuits corresponding to server computation operations divided by
B.
Efficiency measures. Three measures of efficiency can be considered for a Shuffling algorithm: the total
bandwidth T , the amount S of client memory and the amount M of server memory. Note that oblivious
shuffling of N data blocks is trivial for clients with memory S ≥ N : download all the N encrypted blocks in
some fixed order; decrypt and re-encrypt each block; finally, upload the newly encrypted blocks to the new
locations one by one in some fixed order.
In this paper, we give oblivious shuffling algorithms that use memory S = o(N) and server memory
M = O(N). In most cases, server memory is cheaper than block transfers, so we do not try to optimize
for the hidden constants of server memory (which is however small for all our constructions). Our main
objective is to design algorithms with small T .
The security notion. A transcript of an execution of a Shuffling algorithm Sh consists of the initial
content of the server memory, the ordered list of the sources of all download moves, the ordered list of
the destinations of all the upload moves as well as the data blocks uploaded with each move, and the list
of circuits uploaded by the client. We stress that a transcript only contains the server locations that are
involved in each move (that is the source for the downloads and the destination for the uploads) but not the
client locations so to model the fact that an adversarial server A cannot observe where each block is stored
when downloaded and from which client location each uploaded block comes from.
For every sequence of N blocks B = (B1, . . . , BN ), every subset Touched of touched blocks, and every pair
of permutations (pi, σ), a Shuffling algorithm Sh naturally induces a probability distribution TSh(B, pi, σ,Touched)
over all possible transcripts. We capture the notion of a K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm by the following
game OSGameASh for Shuffling algorithm Sh between an adversary A and the challenger C. In the formal-
ization of our notion of security, we allow the adversary A to receive partial information on the starting
permutation map pi to reflect the fact that the Shuffling algorithm Sh might be part of a larger protocol
whose execution leaks information on pi. More precisely, in our formalization we allow A to choose the initial
location on the server of a subset Touched of the N data blocks and we parametrize the security notion by
the cardinality K of the set Touched. The challenger C fills in the remaining N−K locations randomly under
the constraint that each of the N blocks appears in exactly one location on the server. Then, A proposes
two sequences, B0 and B1, of N blocks and two permutations, σ0 and σ1, and C randomly picks b ∈ {0, 1}
and samples a transcript MSh(Enc(K,Bb), pi, σb,Touched) according to T Sh(Enc(K,Bb), pi, σb,Touched). A
then, on input trans, outputs its guess b′ for b. We say that an adversary A is K-restricted if it specifies
the location of at most K blocks; that is |Touched| ≤ K.
Definition 2.1. For shuffle algorithm Sh and adversary A, we define game OSGameASh(N,λ) as follows
1. A chooses a subset Touched ⊆ [N ] and specifies pi(i) for each i ∈ Touched;
2. A chooses two pairs (B0, σ0) and (B1, σ1) and sends them to C;
3. C completes the permutation pi by randomly choosing the values at the point left unspecified by A;
4. C randomly selects b← {0, 1} and sendsA transcriptMSh(Enc(K,Bb), pi, σb,Touched), drawn according
to T Sh(Enc(K,Bb), pi, σb,Touched);
5. A on input MSh(Enc(K,Bb), pi, σb,Touched) outputs b′;
Output 1 iff b = b′.
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Definition 2.2 (K-Oblivious Shuffling). We say that Shuffling algorithm Sh is a K-Oblivious Shuffling
algorithm if for all K-restricted probabilistically polynomial time adversaries A, and for all N = poly(λ)
Pr[OSGameASh(N,λ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(λ).
We refer to N -Oblivious Shuffling as just Oblivious Shuffling.
3 Tools
In this section we review some of the tools we use to prove security of our constructions.
3.1 Encryption
As we previously mentioned, the basic operation of oblivious shuffling involves either download a block from
the server to the client or uploading a block from the client to the server. This means that the same block
could be downloaded in one step and subsequently uploaded in a future step. We wish to prevent the server
from linking that the same block was being downloaded/uploaded at various steps.
To prevent the server from linking data contents, the client can always decrypt and encrypt each data
block with new randomness that is independent on the input and output permutations. The IND-CPA game
encompasses the above needs. In simple terms, IND-CPA states that the encryption of two plaintexts are
indistinguishable.
Definition 3.1 (IND-CPA). Let A be an adversary and C consisting of Enc and Dec be the challenger. The
following game between A and C is defined as the IndCPAGameA(Enc,Dec)(λ) game.
1. C generates private key key of length λ;
2. A asks for poly(λ) encryptions under key from C;
3. A submits two distinct plaintexts p0 and p1 as the challenge;
4. C picks secret bit b and sends Enc(key, pb) to A;
5. A asks for poly(λ) encryptions under key from C;
6. A outputs b′;
Output 1 iff b = b′.
Definition 3.2 (IND-CPA secure). We say that the encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) is IND-CPA secure if for
all probabilistically-polynomial time adversaries A,
Pr[IndCPAGameA(Enc,Dec)(λ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(λ).
Throughout the rest of this work, we will assume that (Enc,Dec) is secure under IND-CPA.
3.2 Pseudorandom Permutations
In the problem definition, we state that the input of the Shuffle problem includes two permutations, pi and σ.
In general, storing true random permutations requires O(N logN) bits via information theory lower bounds.
However, it is possible to have space-efficient constructions for pseudorandom permutations. Furthermore,
we still wish for the permutation to be accessible, that is fast to evaluate pi(i) for any i. For example, we do
not want to be required to use O(N) computation to find pi(i).
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One of the first space-efficient pseudorandom permutations was by Black and Rogaway [3], which re-
quired the storage of only three keys. However, their scheme only provided security guarantees for up N1/4
evaluations. Work by Morris et al [14] pushed the guarantees up to N1− queries. The construction by
Hoang et al [11] pushed security up to (1− )N queries until the Mix-and-Cut Shuffle [19] provided a fully-
secure pseudorandom permutation allowing evaluation on all N possible inputs. The Sometimes-Recurse
Shuffle [13] the efficiency of the Mix-and-Cut Shuffle allowing evaluations in O(logN) AES evaluations while
only storing a single key.
For any sublinear storage Oblivious Shuffling algorithms to make sense, we will assume that the input
and output permutations pi and σ are pseudorandom permutations with small storage. In practice, the
Sometimes-Recurse Shuffle [13] would suffice.
3.3 Proving K-Obliviousness for Move-Based Shuffling Algorithms
Move-based algorithms only perform move operations between the server storage and the client storage
and never ask the server to perform any computation on the encrypted blocks stored on server stor-
age. For this class of algorithms, to prove obliviousness it is sufficient to show that for every random pi
and for every Touched, the sequence consisting of the sources of the download moves and of the desti-
nation of the upload moves is independent of σ give Touched and pi(Touched). More precisely, we define
MSh(Enc(K,B), pi, σ,Touched) as the distribution of the move transcript Mtrans obtained from a transcript
trans distributed according to T Sh(Enc(K,B), pi, σ,Touched) by removing the initial encrypted blocks and the
encrypted blocks associated with upload moves. It is not difficult to prove that if T Sh(Enc(K,B), pi, σ,Touched)
is independent of σ given Touched and pi(Touched) and the encryption scheme is IND-CPA, then Sh is a
K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm.
3.4 Probability tools
We will use the notion of negatively associated random variables.
Definition 3.3. The random variables X1, . . . , Xn are negatively associated if for every two disjoint index
sets, I, J ⊆ [n],
E[f(Xi, i ∈ I) · g(Xj , j ∈ J)] ≤ E[f(Xi, i ∈ I)] · E[g(Xj , j ∈ J)],
for all functions f and g that both non-increasing or both non-decreasing.
We are going to use the following property of negatively associated random variables. For a proof see,
for example, Lemma 2 of [4].
Lemma 3.1. Let X1, . . . , Xn be negatively associated random variables. Then, for non-decreasing functions
f1, . . . , fk over disjoint variable sets S1, . . . , Sk
E
∏
i∈[k]
fi(Si)
 ≤ ∏
i∈[k]
E [fi(Si)] .
We will also use the fact that the Balls and Bins process is negatively associated (see Section 2.2 from [4]).
Theorem 3.2. Consider the Balls and Bins process with m balls and n bins. Let B1, . . . , Bn be the number
of balls in each of the bins. Then, B1, . . . , Bn are negatively associated.
We use the following theorem from Queuing Theory (see [20] for a proof).
Theorem 3.3. Let Q be a queue with batched arrival rate 1 −  and departure rate 1 and let qt be the size
of the queue after t batches of arrival. Then, for all  > 0, E[eqt ] ≤ 2.
We will also use concentration inequalities over the sum of independent binary random variables.
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Theorem 3.4 (Chernoff Bounds). Let X = X1 + . . . + Xn, where Xi = 1 with probability pi and Xi = 0
with probability 1− pi and all Xi are independent. Let µ = E[X] = p1 + . . .+ pn. Then
1. Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ exp(− δ2µ2+δ )
2. Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤ exp(− δ2µ2 )
4 Oblivious Shuffling with O(
√
N) Client Memory
In this section we describe CacheShuffleRoot, an Oblivious Shuffling algorithm that uses O(
√
N) client storage
except with negligible probability. More precisely, for every  > 0, we describe an algorithm CacheShuffleRoot
uses (3+/2)N server storage, bandwidth (4+)N and, except with negligible in N probability, δ
√
N client
storage, for some constant δ that depends solely from . Whenever  is clear from the context or immaterial,
we will just call the algorithm CacheShuffleRoot.
We start by describing a simple algorithm that does not work but it gives a general idea of how we achieve
shuffling using small client memory.
For permutations (pi, σ), the input is an array Source[1, . . . , N ] of N ciphertexts stored on server storage.
An encryption of block Bl is stored as Source[pi(l)], for l = 1, . . . , N . The expected output is an array
Dest[1, . . . , N ] such position Dest[σ(l)], contains an encryption of Bl. The N indices of Dest are randomly
partitioned into q :=
√
N destination buckets, destInd1, . . . , destIndq, by assigning each j ∈ [N ] to a uniformly
chosen destination bucket. Then the indices of array Source are partitioned into s :=
√
N groups of N/s =√
N indices with the j-th group consisting of indices in the interval [(j−1)N/s+1, . . . , j ·N/s], for j = 1, . . . , s.
On average, each bucket has q = s indices and exactly one index from each group is assigned by σ to each
destination bucket. If this were actually the case, then the shuffle could be easily performed as follows using
only s blocks of client memory. The blocks in each group of indices of Source are downloaded one at a time
in client memory. When the j-th group has been completely downloaded, exactly one block is uploaded to
the j-th position of each destination bucket. After all groups have been processed, each destination bucket
contains all the blocks albeit in the wrong order. This can then be fixed easily by entirely downloading each
destination bucket, one at a time, to client memory and uploading the blocks in the correct order.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that indices will distribute nicely over destination buckets. Algorithm
CacheShuffleRoot is similar except that it does not expect each source group to contain exactly one block for
each destination bucket and, for the few failures, it stores the extra blocks in a cache stored at the client’s
private storage with the hope that there will never be too many extra blocks. It turns out that, for the above
statement to be true, we need a little bit of slackness that we achieve by slightly increasing the number of
partitions of Dest to q = (1 + /2)
√
N , for some  > 0. As we shall see, the algorithm of Section 5 will adopt
the same framework but for technical reasons we will create slackness in a different way. Let us now proceed
more formally.
4.1 CacheShuffleRoot Description
For  > 0, we next describe algorithm CacheShuffleRoot for input (pi, σ). Algorithm CacheShuffleRoot
receives as inputs the permutations pi and σ and the source array Source[1, . . . , N ] of N ciphertexts such that
an encryption of block Bl is stored as Source[pi(l)], for l = 1, . . . , N . CacheShuffle outputs a destination array
Dest[1, . . . , N ] of N ciphertexts such that an encryption of block Bl is stored as Dest[σ(l)], for l = 1, . . . , N .
The N indices of Source are partitioned by the algorithm into s :=
√
N groups srcInd1, . . . , srcInds, each
of size N/s =
√
N , with srcIndj containing indices in the interval [(j−1) ·s+1, . . . , j ·s]. The N indices of the
destination array Dest are randomly partitioned by the algorithm into q := (1+ /2)
√
N destination buckets,
destInd1, . . . , destIndq, by assigning each i ∈ [N ] to a randomly chosen destination bucket. A destination
bucket is expected to contain N/q ≈ (1 − /2)√N locations. In addition, for each destination bucket, the
algorithm initializes q temporary arrays temp1, . . . , tempq each of size s on the server and q caches Q1, . . . ,Qq
on the client. The working of the algorithm is divided into two phases: Spray and Recalibrate.
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The Spray phase consists of s rounds, one for each group. In the i-th Spray round, the algorithm downloads
all ciphertexts in the i-th group srcIndi. Each downloaded ciphertext is decrypted, thus giving a block, say
Bl, that is re-encrypted with fresh randomness and stored in the cache corresponding to the destination
bucket containing σ(l), that is Bl’s final destination. After all s blocks of srcIndi have been downloaded
and assigned to the caches, the algorithm uploads one block from Qj , for j = 1, . . . , q, to the i-th position
of temporary array tempj . If a queue is empty a dummy block containing an encryption of 0’s is uploaded
instead.
Note that after the Spray phase has completed every block has been downloaded from the source array
and some have been uploaded to a temporary array and some are still in the caches. Nonetheless, each
temporary array contains exactly s ciphertexts and all non-dummy blocks whose encryption is in tempj are
assigned by σ to a position in destIndj .
The Recalibrate phase has a round for each destination bucket. In the round for destination bucket
destIndj , the algorithm downloads all blocks from temporary array tempj in increasing order. Each block is
decrypted, dummy blocks are discarded and the remaining blocks are re-encrypted using fresh randomness.
Now, all blocks that belong in destIndj are in client memory and the algorithm uploads them to the correct
position in destIndj according to σ. We present pseudocode of the algorithm in Appendix B.
4.2 Properties of CacheShuffleRoot
It is easy to see that CacheShuffleRoot uses (3 + /2)N blocks of server memory and (4 + )N blocks of
bandwidth. Next, we are going to show that, for every  > 0 there exists δ such that the probability that at
any given time the total size of the caches exceeds δ · √N is negligible.
We denote by li,j the size of Qj after processing srcIndi. Thus, we are interested in bounding li =
li,1 + . . .+ li,q for all rounds i = 1, . . . , s.
Lemma 4.1. For every  > 0, there exists δ such that Pr[li > δq] < e
−q.
Proof. Let Xi,j for all i ∈ [s] and j ∈ [q] be the number of blocks that go from srcIndi into Qj . For any fixed
i, the set Xi,1, . . . , Xi,q is a Balls and Bins process with q bins. Therefore, by Theorem 3.2, Xi,1, . . . , Xi,q
are negatively associated. For any i 6= j, the sets of variables Xi,1, . . . , Xi,q and Xj,1, . . . , Xj,q are mutually
independent. By Proposition 7.1 of [4], the sets are also negatively associated. Note, note that each li,j is
a non-decreasing function of the set of variables X1,j , . . . , Xi,j . Therefore, for any j 6= k, li,j and li,k are
non-decreasing functions over a disjoint set of negatively associated variables.
By Markov’s Inequality, we get that Pr[li > δq] = Pr[e
li > eδq] < e−δq E[eli ]. For each Qj , j = 1, . . . , q,
the batched arrival rate is (N/s)/q ≈ (1− ) and the departure rate is 1. So,
E[eqi ] = E
 q∏
j=1
eli,j
 ≤ q∏
j=1
E[eli,j ] ≤ 2q.
The second inequality follows from Theorem 3.1 since li,j are non-decreasing functions over disjoint sets
of negatively associated variables. The last inequality is by Theorem 3.3. Therefore, Pr[li > δq] <
e−(δ

1+−ln 2)q. The lemma follows when δ > (1 + 1/) ln 2e.
Note that, since q = (1 + )
√
N , the probability that any given time the total size of the caches exceeds
δq is negligible in N . We also remark that the Spray phase can be generalized to any two values of s and q
such that s · q = (1 + )N in which case memory O(q) is used except with probability exponentially small in
q. This fact will be used in Section 5. Next we prove obliviousness.
Lemma 4.2. For every  > 0, CacheShuffleRoot is an Oblivious Shuffling algorithm.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the accesses to server storage, that is the sources of the download moves
and the destinations of the upload moves, are independent of σ, for random pi.
10
In the j-th round of the Spray phase, downloads are performed from srcIndj and uploads have as desti-
nation the j-th slot of each tempi. Clearly these moves are independent of σ.
In the j-th round of the Recalibrate phase, the downloads of tempj occur in increasing order, independent
of σ. The uploads have as destination the entries of destIndj in increasing order which is clearly independent
of σ.
5 Oblivious Shuffling with Smaller Client Memory
In this section we generalize algorithm CacheShuffleRoot to CacheShuffle. Specifically, for S = ω(logN), we
provide an Oblivious Shuffling algorithm that uses O(S) client memory and O(N logS N) bandwidth.
When CacheShuffleRoot completes the Spray phase, all the data blocks that according to σ belong to a
location in destination bucket destBi are either on the server in tempi or in client memory in Qi. The i-th
Recalibrate step then takes the blocks from each tempi and Qi, and arranges them so that they all end up in
the right position according to σ in destBi. The i-th Recalibrate step needs memory exactly equal to the size
of tempi. The key to a Oblivious Shuffling that uses less client memory resides in a Spray phase that uses
smaller memory while producing smaller tempi. We call this new method as RSpray.
5.1 Description of RSpray
Algorithm RSpray is similar to Spray described in Section 4 but it achieves the needed slackness in a different
way. Specifically, the slackness is needed to ensure that the arrival rate to each cache is smaller than the
departure rate by at least a constant and this is obtained by making the number q of caches larger than the
number of ciphertexts in an input group by a constant factor. RSpray instead takes a dual approach: the
number of caches is equal to the number of ciphertexts in an input group but it assumes that each group
has a constant fraction of dummy ciphertexts that need not to be added to the queue. There is one extra
subtle point. Since we need the dummy to be uniformly distributed over the groups, RSpray partitions the
input into random buckets. Let us proceed more formally.
Algorithm RSpray receives as input source array RSource[1, . . . , n] of n ciphertexts and a set D ⊆ [N ] of d
destination indices. RSource contains the encryptions of all blocks l with σ(l) ∈ D as well as the encryptions
of some dummy blocks. Clearly, n ≥ d. RSource is stored on the server and D is a private input to RSpray.
RSpray is parametrized by the size S of the client storage and outputs q := S temporary arrays,
temp1, . . . , tempq, of ciphertexts and a partition of set D into q subsets of destination indices D1, . . . , Dq.
The arrays and the subsets of the partition are linked by the following property: if σ(l) ∈ Dj then one of
the ciphertexts of tempj is an encryption of block l.
We next formally describe RSpray. Algorithm RSpray partitions D into q subsets of destination buckets,
D1, . . . , Dq, by assigning each index in D to a randomly and uniformly selected subset of the q. Each subset
Dj is associated with a temporary array tempj stored on the server and a cache Qj stored on the client.
Initially, both tempj and Qj are empty and tempj will grow to contain exactly s := n/q ciphertexts. The
algorithm then partitions RSource into s source buckets, sourceB1, . . . , sourceBs that are stored on the server.
Each ciphertext of RSource is randomly assigned to one of the s source buckets uniformly at random.
Now, just as Spray, algorithm RSpray has s spray rounds, one for each source bucket. The spray round for
a source bucket also terminates by uploading exactly one ciphertext from each cache Qj to the corresponding
temporary bucket tempj . If a cache happens to be empty, a dummy block is encrypted and uploaded.
After all spray rounds have been completed, each tempj contains exactly s ciphertexts (as exactly one is
uploaded for each source bucket) and we have that if an encryption of block Bl was in RSource at the start
of RSpray then at the end of the spray phase an encryption of the same block occupies a location in Qj or
tempj , where σ(l) ∈ Dj .
Algorithm RSpray has a final adjustment phase for each tempj in which all ciphertexts in the cache Qj are
uploaded to tempj . This is achieved in the following way. In the adjustment phase for tempj , each ciphertext
in tempj is downloaded and decrypted. If decryption returns a real block (non-dummy) then the block is
re-encrypted and uploaded again. If instead a dummy block is obtained, then two cases are possible. In the
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first case, Qj is not empty; then a ciphertext from the cache is uploaded instead. In the second case instead
Qj is empty and a new ciphertext of a dummy block is uploaded.
If, once all adjustment phases have been completed, there is a non-empty cache Qj then RSpray fails and
aborts.
5.1.1 Properties of RSpray
We first observe that RSpray uses bandwidth 4n. Indeed, in the spray phase exactly n ciphertexts are
downloaded from RSource to client memory and exactly n are uploaded to the temporary buckets. In the
adjustment phase exactly n are downloaded and n are uploaded from the temporary buckets.
Moreover, if RSpray does not abort, we have that if an encryption of block Bl was in RSource then at the
end of RSpray an encryption of Bl is found in tempj for j such that σ(l) ∈ Dj .
We next prove that if there exists a constant  such that d ≤ (1 − )n, then the algorithm aborts with
negligible probability. In other words, we assume that of the n ciphertexts in RSource, at least an  fraction
consists of encryptions of dummy blocks. We will then show that, except with negligible probability, this is
the case in all calls to RSpray of CacheShuffle.
Lemma 5.1. If d ≤ (1− )n then RSpray aborts with probability at most c−nS for some constant c > 1 that
only depends on .
Proof. RSpray aborts when it cannot copy an encryption of each block assigned to some Dj by σ to tempj
because Dj is larger than tempj (note that each temporary bucket has exactly s = n/S slots). Note that
E[|Di|] = d/q ≤ (1 − )n/S and it is the sum of d 0/1 independent random variables. The lemma then
follows from the Chernoff bound.
We next bound the memory needed by the client to store the caches Qj . Specifically, we show that for
every  > 0, there exists δ such that, for all δ > δ the probability that the total number of blocks in the
caches exceeds δS is negligible. As before, we let li,j denote the size of Qj after the i-th spray round and set
and li = li,1 + . . .+ li,q.
Lemma 5.2. For every  > 0 and i ∈ [s] if d ≤ (1− )n, there exists δ such that Pr[li > δq] < e−q, for all
δ > δ.
Proof. The proof proceeds as the one of Lemma 4.1. Negative associativity still holds for the Xi,j , the
random variable of the number of blocks in sourceBi that go into Qj , as they have the same distribution
of the Balls and Bins process with d balls and q bins. By Markov’s Inequality, we get that Pr[li > δq] =
Pr[eli > eδq] < e−δq E[eli ]. Then we observe each source bucket has expected size q and since each source
bucket is randomly chosen from a set of n ciphertext at most (1− )n of which are real, each source bucket
contains on average at most (1− )q real ciphertexts. Therefore the arrival rate at each cache of the q caches
is at most (1− ) and departure is exactly 1. The proof then proceeds as in Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 5.3. The move transcript of RSpray is independent of σ.
Proof. The only difference between Spray and RSpray is that how the source arrays are distributed. In RSpray,
each block of RSource is assigned uniformly at random to one sourceBi independently of σ. The rest of the
proof follows identically to Spray.
5.2 Description of CacheShuffle
We are now ready to describe algorithm CacheShuffle which will use RSpray and Spray as subroutines to
Oblivious Shuffle with O(S) client storage. CacheShuffle receives permutations pi and σ a a source array
Source[1, . . . , N ] of N ciphertexts such that an encryption of block Bl is stored as Source[pi(l)], for l =
1, . . . , N . CacheShuffle outputs a destination array Dest[1, . . . , N ] of N ciphertexts such that an encryption
of block Bl is stored as Dest[σ(l)], for l = 1, . . . , N .
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CacheShuffle starts by running the Spray algorithm of CacheShuffleRoot with parameters s := N/S and
q := (1 + )S. Note, Spray will only use O(S) client memory with these parameters and results in the
following:
1. q caches Q1, . . . ,Qq on the client;
2. q temporary arrays temp1, . . . , tempq on the server;
3. q destination buckets destB1, . . . , destBq on the client such that if σ(i) ∈ destBj then Qj or tempj
contain an encryption of Bi;
Next, for j = 1, . . . , q, the algorithm performs a adjustment of Qj into tempj as explained above in the
description of RSpray. Once adjustment has been performed, we have that for i = 1, . . . , N , if σ(i) ∈ destBj
then tempj contains an encryption of Bi.
Next, CacheShuffle calls algorithm RSpray on each bucket tempj until, after l = O(logS N) recursive calls,
it obtains buckets templ,j of ciphertexts for destination buckets destBl,j of size smaller than S
2. At this
point each bucket is oblivious shuffled into the subset of Dest corresponding to the indices in the destination
bucket using algorithm CacheShuffleRoot.
5.3 Properties of CacheShuffle
The first invocation Spray method requires O(N) blocks of bandwidth. At level i of RSpray calls, there are
Si calls of RSpray each on source arrays of size O(N/Si). Therefore, each level requires O(N) blocks of
bandwidth and altogether O(N logS N) blocks of bandwidth for all levels. Finally, each of the O(N/S
2) exe-
cutions of CacheShuffleRoot requires O(S2) blocks of bandwidth. In total, O(N logS N) blocks of bandwidth
is required for CacheShuffle. Also, note that CacheShuffle requires O(N) server memory.
The following lemma will be instrumental in proving that the abort probability of CacheShuffle is negligible
and that CacheShuffle uses O(S) client memory.
Lemma 5.4. The probability that a destination bucket of level i call to RSpray has size larger than (1 −
/2)N/Si is negligible in N for S = ω(logN).
Proof. This is certainly true for the first level in which we have n = N and d = (1−)N . The calls to RSpray
at level i of the recursion determine a random partition of [N ] into Si destination buckets each of expected
size di = (1− )N/Si. RSpray is invoked on each destination bucket with a bucket of ni = N/Si ciphertexts.
By applying Chernoff bound, we obtain that the probability that a level i destination bucket is larger than
(1− /2)N/Si is exponentially small in N/Si. This is negligible in N since N/Si ≥ S and S = ω(logN).
We are now ready to prove the following.
Lemma 5.5. Algorithm CacheShuffle fails with negligible probability.
Proof. By the Union Bound we obtain that the probability that any destination bucket in the O(N logS N)
calls to RSpray is too large remains negligible and thus, by applying Lemma 5.1, we obtain that CacheShuffle
aborts with negligible probability.
We now show that CacheShuffle requires O(S) client memory except with negligible probability.
Lemma 5.6. For S = ω(logN), CacheShuffle requires O(S) client memory except with negligible in N
probability.
Proof. Note, that Spray, RSpray and CacheShuffleRoot all use O(S) client memory except with negligible
probability. Altogether, these subroutines are called O(N logS N) times, meaning the probability that any
single execution results in more than O(S) client memory is remains negligible. Finally, the moving of Qi
back to tempi after Spray requires O(1) extra client memory.
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The above lemma only works when N/S = ω(logN) or S ≤ O(N/ logN). However, we note this is not
an issue since when S = O(
√
N), CacheShuffleRoot should be used instead of CacheShuffle.
Theorem 5.7. CacheShuffle is an Oblivious Shuffling algorithm.
Proof. From previous sections, we have shown that the move transcripts of Spray, RSpray and CacheShuffleRoot
are independent of σ except with negligible probability. Since there are a total of O(N) calls to these three
subroutines, the probability that any subroutine is dependent on σ is still negligible.
It remains to show the moving of Qi into tempi after Spray is independent of σ. Note, the adversary sees
the download and upload to each location of tempi in an arbitrary manner. So, if CacheShuffle does not fail,
this process remains independent of σ. By Lemma 5.5, CacheShuffle fails only with negligible probability.
6 K-Oblivious Shuffling with O(K) Client Memory
In this section, we assume that the number K of touched blocks is small enough to fit into client memory
and give a K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm, KCacheShuffleBasic, that uses bandwidth 2N to shuffle N data
blocks.
KCacheShuffleBasic takes as input two permutations (pi, σ) and the encryptions of blocks B1, . . . , BN in
array Source[1 . . . N ] arranged according to pi. That is, an encryption of block Bi is stored as Source[pi(i)].
In addition, the algorithm also receives Touched, the set of indices of the touched blocks as well as the set
pi(Touched) of their positions in Source. At the end of the algorithm, encryptions of the same N blocks will
be stored in array Dest arranged according to permutation σ; that is, an encryption of block Bi is stored as
Dest[σ(i)]. The algorithm works into two phases.
In the first phase, algorithm KCacheShuffleBasic downloads the encryptions of the touched blocks from
Source; that is, the encryption of Bi, stored as Source[pi(i)], is downloaded for all i ∈ Touched. Each block is
decrypted, re-encrypted using fresh randomness and stored in client memory. Once all touched blocks have
been downloaded, algorithm KCacheShuffleBasic initializes the set tbDown of indices of data blocks that have
not been downloaded by setting tbDown = [N ] \ Touched.
The second phase consists of N steps, for i = 1, . . . , N . At the end of the i-th step, Dest[i] contains an
encryption of block Bσ−1(i). Let us use s as a shorthand for σ
−1(i). Three cases are possible. In the first case,
an encryption of Bs is not in client memory, that is s ∈ tbDown; then the algorithm sets r = s. If instead, an
encryption of Bs is already in client memory, that is s 6∈ tbDown, and tbDown 6= ∅, the algorithm randomly
selects r ∈ tbDown. In both these first two cases, the algorithm downloads an encryption of block Br found
at Source[pi(r)], decrypts it and re-encrypts it using fresh randomness, stores it in client memory and updates
tbDown by setting tbDown = tbDown \ {r}. In the third case in which s 6∈ tbDown and tbDown = ∅, no block
is downloaded. The i-th step is then complete by uploading an encryption of Bs to Dest[i]. Note that at
this point, the client memory certainly contains an encryption of Bs. We present the pseudocode for this
algorithm in Appendix C.
In the above description, it seems like the algorithm would require N roundtrips of data between the
client and the server. However, we can easily reduce the roundtrips by grouping indexes of Dest together.
Specifically, we can group indexes of Dest into groups of size O(K) and perform the required downloads and
uploads in O(N/K) roundtrips.
6.1 Properties of KCacheShuffleBasic
Initially, the client downloads exactly K blocks. At each step, exactly one block is uploaded and at most
one is downloaded. Therefore, client memory never exceeds K. Each block is downloaded exactly once and
uploaded exactly once. So bandwidth is exactly 2N blocks.
Theorem 6.1. KCacheShuffleBasic is a K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that the accesses of KCacheShuffleBasic to server memory are
independent from σ, for randomly chosen pi, given the sets Touched and pi(Touched). This is certainly true
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for the downloads of the first phase as they correspond to pi(Touched). For the second phase, we observe that
at the i-th step an upload is made to Dest[i], which is clearly independent from σ. Regarding the downloads,
we observe that the set tbDown initially contains N − K elements and it decrease by one at each step.
Therefore, it will be empty for the last K steps and thus no download will be performed. For i ≤ N −K,
the download of the i-th step is from Source[pi(r)]. In the first case r is a random element of tbDown and
thus independent from σ; in the second case, the download is from Source[pi(s)], with s = σ−1(i). Since
s 6∈ Touched, for otherwise an encryption Bs would have been in client memory, the value pi(s) is independent
from σ.
7 K-Oblivious Shuffling with Smaller Client Memory
In this section, for every S, we describe KCacheShuffleS , a K-Oblivious Shuffling that uses O(S) blocks of
client memory. Algorithm KCacheShuffleS (or, simply, KCacheShuffle) takes as input two permutations (pi, σ)
and the encryptions of N blocks in array Source arranged according to pi. In addition, the algorithm also
receives the set Touched of the indices of the touched blocks and the set pi(Touched) of their positions in
Source. At the end of the algorithm, encryptions of the same N blocks will be stored in array Dest arranged
according to permutation σ. Algorithm KCacheShuffleS can be described as consisting of the following three
phases. We let  > 0 be a constant.
The first phase obliviously assigns the K touched blocks to q = (1 + )K/S touched buckets, touchCt1,
. . . , touchCtq, each consisting of S ciphertexts that are encryptions of touched and dummy blocks. Bucket
touchCtj , for j = 1, . . . , q, is associated with the subset touchIndj ⊆ σ(Touched) and touchCtj contains an
encryption of touched block Bi if and only if σ(i) ∈ touchIndj . This is achieved by invoking algorithm
CacheShuffle for memory S and skipping the last Recalibrate phase of the last invocation of CacheShuffleRoot.
The partition (touchInd1, . . . , touchIndq) returned is a random parition of σ(Touched) into q subsets. The
acute reader might notice that CacheShuffleRoot does not guarantee that each touchCti will contain exactly
S ciphertexts. We note that this can be achieved by slightly decreasing the number of caches for a couple
recursion levels of CacheShuffle.
The second phase merges the touched and the untouched blocks into q buckets. More specifically, the sec-
ond phase extends the partition (touchInd1, . . . , touchIndq) of σ(Touched) into a partition (destInd1, . . . , destIndq)
of the set [N ] of the indices of array Dest; that is, touchIndj ⊆ destIndj , for j = 1, . . . , q. In addition, each
set of indices destIndj is associated with a bucket of ciphertexts destCtj that contains an encryption of every
block (touched and untouched) Bi such that σ(i) ∈ destIndj . It turns out though that an approach similar
to the one used in KCacheShuffleBasic would not work here and we need a more sophisticated algorithm.
Let us see why. Following KCacheShuffleBasic, the algorithm downloads each touched bucket touchCtj to
client memory (note that each has size S so it will fit into memory) decrypt all ciphertexts, removes the
dummy blocks, and re-encrypts the other blocks. The set tbDownj of untouched blocks of destIndj still to
be downloaded is initialized by the algorithm as tbDownj := σ
−1(destIndj \ touchIndj). Now, the algorithm
iterates through each index i ∈ destIndj in increasing order. If block Bk assigned to location i by σ (that is,
k = σ−1(i)) is not in client memory, the algorithms downloads its encryption stored as Source[pi(σ−1(i))] and
removes i from tbDownj . If instead it is available in client memory, the algorithm randomly selects random
index of k ∈ tbDownj , removes it from tbDownj and downloads Source[pi(k)]. When tbDownj is empty, the
algorithm does not download anything. Unfortunately, such an algorithm is not oblivious, since the number
of downloads performed for destIndj reveals the cardinality of tbDownj from which the adversary obtains the
number of touched blocks associated that are assigned by σ to destIndj . Note that KCacheShuffleBasic does
not suffer this problem as there is only one bucket comprising all N indices. Thus, the algorithm only leaks
the total number K of touched blocks which is already known to the adversary.
The merging of touched and untouched blocks is instead achieved by the following two-phase process. As
before, the algorithm has a round for each destIndj , starting with j = 1, and the j-th round starts with the
algorithm downloading the S ciphertexts in touchCtj and by initializing tbDownj := σ
−1(destIndj\touchIndj).
However, unlike in the previous approach, in each round the algorithm dowloads exactly uj := |destIndj | −
(1 − )K/q untouched blocks. If more than uj untouched blocks belong to destIndj under σ, the algorithm
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fails (and we will show that this happens with negligible probability). If instead fewer than uj untouched
blocks are assigned by σ to destIndj , the extra downloads are used to bring to client memory untouched blocks
that belong to destIndq (or, if none is left in destIndq to be downloaded, blocks that belong to destIndq−1 are
downloaded and so on). Note that if the algorithm does not abort (that is, no more than uj touched blocks
must be downloaded) then we can continue as previously described. Once the encryptions of all blocks have
been uploaded to destIndj , the algorithm is left with a set Remj of extra untouched blocks that have been
downloaded during the j-th round. If |Remj | > 2K/q, the algorithm aborts. Otherwise, the algorithm pads
Remj with encryptions of dummy blocks until there are exactly 2K/q blocks. Then, Remj is uploaded to
the server. At the end of the round, the algorithm has in client memory all blocks that are assigned by σ
to destIndj and the round terminates by uploading the blocks in the current positions of Dest. This second
phase ends when all untouched blocks have been downloaded and they have been uploaded either to the
position in Dest according to σ or are still in some Remj . That is, for some l, the algorithm has still to
process destIndl, . . . , destIndq.
Finally, in the third phase, the algorithm handles all touched blocks whose encryptions are in Rem1, . . . ,Reml−1
and the touched blocks whose encryptions are in touchCtl, . . . , touchCtq. As we shall prove the total number
of remaining blocks is cK and they are shuffled into destIndl, . . . , destIndq by using algorithm CacheShuffle
with memory S.
If the client has O(
√
K) blocks of client storage, then we may replace CacheShuffle with CacheShuffleRoot
above. We refer to this construction as KCacheShuffleRoot.
7.1 Properties of KCacheShuffle
We first show that the probability that KCacheShuffle aborts is negligible. In addition to the executions
of CacheShuffle failing, KCacheShuffle introduces two new possible points of aborting, when |destIndj | −
|touchIndj | > uj or |Remj | > 2K/q. We next show that when S is not too small, the abort probabilityis
negligible.
Lemma 7.1. If S = ω(logN) then KCacheShuffle aborts with probability negligible in N .
Proof. The probability that KCacheShuffle aborts during CacheShuffle is negligible by the result in the pre-
vious section. Let us now compute the probability that the algorithm aborts because one of the Remj is too
large. Note that Remj = uj−(|destIndj |−|touchIndj |) = |touchIndj |−(1−)K/q and thus if |Remj | > 2K/q
then it must be the case that |touchIndj | > (1 + )K/q. Note, that |touchIndj | is the sum of independent
binary random variables and its expected value is K/q. Therefore, by Chernoff Bounds the probability that
Remj is larger than its expected value by a constant fractions is exponentially small in K/q = Θ(S) and
thus negligible in N since S = ω(logN).
Finally, let us compute the probability that the algorithm also aborts because destIndj has more than
uj untouched blocks. This happens when |touchIndj | ≤ (1 − )K/q which, again by Chernoff Bounds and
by the fact that S = ω(logN), has negligible probability as it is the probability that a sum of independent
binary random variables is a constant fraction away from its expected value.
The entire algorithm requires O(N) blocks of server memory and O(S) blocks of client memory. It is
clear that the first execution of CacheShuffle requires O(K logS K) blocks of bandwidth. The uploading and
downloading while processing destination buckets requires at most 2N blocks of bandwidth. We now show
that the last execution of CacheShuffle (or CacheShuffleRoot) is performed over O(K) blocks. That implies
that the algorithm has a total of 2N + (1 + )O(K logS K) blocks of bandwidth.
Lemma 7.2. If S = ω(logN) and K ≤ N/2, then the number of ciphertexts left before the third phase starts
is at most
4 · 
1−  K
except with probability negligible in N .
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Proof. Let destIndl be the first subset that has not been processed by the second phase of the algorithm.
Therefore the third phase receives
|Rem1|+ . . .+ |Reml−1|+ |touchCtl|+ . . .+ |touchCtq|
ciphertexts from the second phase. We know that |Remj | = 2K/q and therefore the (l−1) Remj ’s contribute
at most 2K ciphertexts. Moreover, we know that |touchCtj | = S and therefore we only need to upper bound
the number (q − l + 1) of touched buckets that are left for the third phase.
First observe that the Rem1, . . . ,Reml−1 contain encryptions of all the untouched blocks for destIndj for
j = l, . . . , q. Therefore the number of untouched blocks in the last q − l + 1 subsets destIndl, . . . , destIndq is
at most 2K. Moreover, since each untouched block is assigned to a randomly chosen destIndj , we have the
expected number of untouched blocks in destIndj is (N − K)/q ≥ S. Therefore, by Chernoff Bounds and
since S = ω(logN), destIndj contains at least (1 − )(N −K)/q untouched blocks except with probability
negligible in N . Hence, we have
q − l + 1 ≤ 2K
1−  ·
q
N −K ≤ 2 ·
1 + 
1− 
K
S
.
The above lemma assumes that K ≤ N/2. If K > N/2, we can instead use CacheShuffle without
any performance loss. Finally we prove K-obliviousness of KCacheShuffle by showing that the transcript
MKCacheShuffle(B, pi, σ,Touched) is generated independently of σ given pi and pi(Touched).
Theorem 7.3. KCacheShuffle is a K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm.
Proof. We know the Spray phase and execution of CacheShuffle are independent from previous sections. Note,
the destination buckets are revealed during the Recalibrate phase. When we are uploading to Dest, round i of
Recalibrate uploads one block exactly to each index of destBi. However, all destination buckets are generated
independently of σ. Furthermore, the cardinality of destination buckets are generated independently of σ
implying the number of untouched blocks downloaded each round is also independent of σ. All untouched
blocks downloaded belong to the set of indexes pi([N ] \ Touched), which are generated by the challenge
C independent of σ. Therefore, MKCacheShuffle(B, pi, σ,Touched) is independent of σ, given Touched and
pi(Touched).
8 K-Oblivious Shuffling with Dummy Blocks
In this section, we consider an extension of the version of a K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm which has
applications in fields such as Oblivious RAM constructions. Recall, our reference scenario is a cloud storage
model with a client that wishes to outsource the storage of N data blocks of identical sizes and identified
with the integers in [N ] to a server. Suppose that the client also wants to upload D dummy blocks identified
with the integers N + 1, . . . , N + D. The values of dummy blocks are meaningless and they might be used
to help mask actions from an adversarial server. Clearly, we can arbitrarily pick a value for the dummy
blocks and run a K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm on the N + D blocks. In this section we show that, at
the price of having the server perform some computation, we can design a more efficient algorithm in terms
of bandwidth. Because of the computation that must be performed by the server, the algorithm is not a
move-based algorithm.
8.1 Problem Definition
We modify the permutation maps pi and σ to account for dummy blocks. Specifically, we define pi, σ :
[N +D]→ ([N ] ∪ {⊥}) and, as before, the value pi(j) = i ∈ [N ] means that the i-th data block is stored in
location j on the server. Instead, if pi(j) =⊥, then location j on the server contains a dummy block. Dummy
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blocks can be any arbitrary value but still the server which blocks are dummy or not, since that reveals
information about σ. Note that the number, N , of real blocks and the number, D, of dummy blocks are
known to an adversary and we set M := N +D.
The security game remains the same. A K-restricted adversary, A, gets to know the value of K indices
of pi. Note, these K indices might correspond to dummy blocks. Afterwards, the challenger, C, fills in the
remaining M −K uniformly at random such that each of the N blocks appears exactly once and the rest of
the locations contain dummy blocks. The crux of the security remains hiding any information about σ from
the adversarial server.
8.2 Polynomial Interpolation
The main tool of this section is polynomial interpolation and relies on the property that there exists a unique
degree k − 1 polynomial that passes through k different points with distinct x-coordinates.
We will work on a field Fp, where p is a prime whose bit length is at least the bit length of block
encryptions (including metadata). Suppose the client wishes to upload n real blocks B1, . . . , Bn to locations
i1, . . . , in and d dummy blocks at locations j1, . . . , jd on the server. The client first computes the unique
degree n − 1 polynomial P that passes through the points (i1,Enc(key, B1)), . . . , (in,Enc(key, Bn)). The
polynomial P can be constructed by solving the Vandermonde matrix or using Lagrangian interpolation,
which is computationally faster. The client then sends the n coefficients of P to the server along with the
indices i1, . . . , in and j1, . . . , jd in some arbitrary pre-fixed order; e.g., increasing. The server evaluates the
polynomial at the indices received and writes the value obtained at the location specified by the indices.
Note that the n coefficients need bandwidth equal to n blocks to be transferred. The obvious property that
we are using here to hide which blocks are dummy and which are not is that any subset of n points of the
m = n + d points on which the server is asked to evaluate the polynomial P would have given the same
polynomial P . Therefore, the memory of the n points corresponding to the real blocks that the algorithm
used to determine P is completely lost. Polynomial interpolation via the Vandermonde matrix was used
in [21].
8.3 KCacheShuffleDummy Description
In this section we describe an K-Oblivious Shuffling algorithm, KCacheShuffleDummy, that can be used
when a constant fraction of the blocks are dummies and that uses O(K) client storage. The algorithm is
parametrized by parameter 0 <  < 1 and is adapted from KCacheShuffleBasic and its design requires some
extra care to make the the polynomial interpolation technique applicable. Specifically, a naive application
of the technique might reveal the number of (or an upper bound on) the number of non-dummy blocks from
among the K touched blocks. Indeed, the actual fraction ρ := NN+D of real blocks is assumed to be known
but the algorithm should not leak the fraction of real in a smaller set of blocks and, specifically, in the set
Touched of the touched blocks. However, we use the fact that if we pick any set of L blocks at random,
approximately ρL blocks will be real, for L large enough and, of course, this means that approximately
(1− ρ)L blocks will be dummies.
We proceed to describe KCacheShuffleDummy formally now. Similar to KCacheShuffleBasic, we download
all K touched blocks onto the client, that is the set Source[pi(Touched)]. Set p = N+DL . Now, partition the set
[N+D] into p subsets, destInd1, . . . , destIndp. For each d ∈ [N+D], d is assigned uniformly at random to one
of destInd1, . . . , destIndp. We set tbDown to the indices of Source that have yet to be downloaded and initialize
tbDown = [N + D] / Touched. We process each of the p partitions, one at a time. If |destIndi| > (1 + )L,
then KCacheShuffleDummy aborts and fails. Fix an order of destIndi, say increasing. For each d ∈ destIndi, if
σ−1(d) /∈ tbDown, then an index, r, is chosen uniformly at random from tbDown, if tbDown is non-empty. We
remove r from tbDown and download the block from Source[pi(r)]. On the other hand, if σ−1(d) ∈ tbDown,
then Source[pi(σ−1(d))] is downloaded and σ−1(d) is removed from tbDown. Using σ, we may check the
number of dummy and non-dummy blocks that need to be uploaded to Dest[destIndi]. If there are more than
(1 + )ρL non-dummy blocks, KCacheShuffleDummy aborts and fails. Otherwise, we apply the polynomial
interpolation trick. Specifically, we construct the (1 + )ρL − 1 degree polynomial f(x) using the points
18
{(d,Enc(key,Source[pi(σ−1(d))])) : d ∈ destIndi, σ(d) 6=⊥}. If there are less than (1 + )ρL non-dummy
blocks, we can just use dummy blocks (whose values can be chosen arbitrarily) as points for interpolation.
The polynomial f(x) is given to the server along with the set destIndi. For all d ∈ destIndi, the server places
f(d) into Dest[d]. The pseudocode of KCacheShuffleDummy can be found in Appendix D.
8.4 Properties of KCacheShuffleDummy
Theorem 8.1. For every constant  > 0, KCacheShuffleDummy uses O(K + L) blocks of client memory,
O(N +D) blocks of server memory and D + (2 + )N blocks of bandwidth.
Proof. Note, downloading Source[pi(Touched)] requires K blocks of client memory. During each processing
phase of destIndi, an extra L blocks are downloaded onto client memory. Afterwards, exactly L blocks are
sent back to the server. Therefore, at any point in time, at most O(K+L) blocks are on client memory. Only
Source and Dest are required on the server, meaning O(N + D) blocks of server memory. For bandwidth,
note that each of the N + D blocks of Source are downloaded exactly once. In each of the N+DL phases,
(1 + )(1− ρ)L blocks are uploaded. Therefore, a total of N +D + (1 + )ρ(N +D) = D + (2 + )N blocks
of bandwidth are required.
Lemma 8.2. For every constant  > 0 and L = ω(logN), then KCacheShuffleDummy aborts with negligible
probability.
Proof. KCacheShuffleDummy fails when there exists a partition destIndi either with more than (1+)L indexes
or more than (1 + )ρL non-dummy blocks, that is |{d ∈ destIndi : σ(d) 6=⊥}| > (1 + )ρL. We show both
these events happen with negligible probability using Chernoff Bounds. Fix any partition destIndi. For any
index d ∈ [N + D], the probability that d ∈ destIndi is 1p = LN+D . We set the variable Xd = 1 if and only
if d ∈ destIndi and Xd = 0 otherwise. Let X = X1 + . . . + XN+D and note that E[X] = L. By Chernoff
Bounds and since L = ω(logN),
Pr[X > (1 + )L] ≤ e− (1+)
2
3+ L = negl(N).
We further define variable Yd = 1 if and only if d ∈ destIndi and σ(d) 6=⊥. Otherwise, Yd = 0. Set
Y = Y1 + . . .+ YN+D, which is the number of non-dummy blocks destined for indexes in destIndi. Note that
E[Y ] = ρL. By Chernoff Bounds and since L = ω(logN),
Pr[Y > (1 + )ρL] ≤ e− (1+)
2
3+ ρL = negl(N).
Therefore, the probability that KCacheShuffleDummy fails when processing destIndi is negligible inN . Finally,
by Union Bound over destInd1, . . . , destIndp, we complete the proof.
Lemma 8.3. If KCacheShuffleDummy does not abort, then KCacheShuffleDummy is K-Oblivious Shuffling.
Proof. KCacheShuffleDummy and KCacheShuffleBasic only differ in that KCacheShuffleDummy uploads a de-
scription of a polynomial using (1+)ρL values instead of all L values like KCacheShuffleBasic. Note, picking
any subset of (1 + )ρL of the destIndi would have resulted in the same polynomial. Therefore, it is impos-
sible to distinguish dummy and non-dummy blocks using the polynomial. The rest of the proof is similar to
KCacheShuffleBasic.
Theorem 8.4. For every  > 0 and L = ω(logN), KCacheShuffleDummy is K-Oblivious Shuffling except
with negligible probability.
Proof. By Lemma 8.2, KCacheShuffleDummy aborts with negligible probability. By Lemma 8.3, if KCacheShuffleDummy
does not abort, KCacheShuffleDummy is K-Oblivious Shuffling.
We note that when K ≥ L, then the client storage can simply be represented as O(K).
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9 Applications to Oblivious RAM
In this section we show how to apply the constructions of the previous sections to the problem of designing
efficient ORAM.
9.1 Problem Definition
We formally define the Oblivious RAM problem here. A client wishes to outsource their data to a server.
The client’s data consists of N blocks, each containing exactly B words. Before uploading to the server,
the client will encrypt blocks using an IND-CPA scheme. We will implicitly assume that before uploading a
block, the client always encrypts. Similarly, after downloading a block, the client will automatically decrypt.
Encryption ensures the data contents are not revealed to the server. However, the patterns of accessing blocks
may reveal information. Oblivious RAM protocols protect the client from giving information about accesses
to the server. Formally, an adversarial server cannot distinguish two patterns with the same number of
accesses in an Oblivious RAM scheme. We describe a modern variation of the first ORAM scheme described
in [5] and show improvements by using KCacheShuffleBasic.
9.2 Original Square Root ORAM
It is assumed that N blocks are stored on the server according some permutation pi (which could be pseu-
dorandom like the Sometimes-Recurse Shuffle). The permutation pi is stored on the client, hidden from the
server. Additionally, the client initially has
√
N empty slots for blocks. To query for block q, the client
first checks if block q exists in one of the
√
N client block slots. If block q is not on the client, ask the
server to download the block at location pi(q) and store it in an empty slot on the client. Otherwise, the
client asks the server for an arbitrary location that has not previously been downloaded, which is also stored
on the client. The client can perform
√
N queries (until all slots are filled), before an oblivious shuffle oc-
curs. In the original work, the AKS sorting network [1] was used. However, AKS is too slow for practice
due to large constants, so Batcher’s Sort [2] is usually used for practical solutions. We replace AKS with
KCacheShuffleBasic with K =
√
N . The
√
N downloaded blocks will act as the revealed indices of Touched.
We note that all revealed indices are already on the client, so the initial download of revealed indices can
be skipped. Therefore, exactly 2N − √N blocks of bandwidth is used by KCacheShuffleBasic. Note, for
each query, we use exactly 1 block of bandwidth. So over
√
N queries, exactly 2N blocks of bandwidth are
required. The amortized bandwidth of this protocol is 2
√
N , which is at least 5x better than any previous
variant.
Shuffling Algorithm Amortized Bandwidth
Batcher’s Sort [2] O(
√
N log2N)
AKS [1] O(
√
N logN)
MelbourneShuffle [16] (10 + Θ(1))
√
N
KCacheShuffleBasic 2
√
N
When we applied KCacheShuffleBasic, we never showed that security remains intact. We will now argue
that the resulting construction is still an Oblivious RAM. Consider any two access sequences of equal length.
If they perform less than
√
N queries, the access sequences are clearly indistinguishable. Suppose that there
are more than
√
N queries. Note, the N − √N remaining untouched blocks were previously obliviously
shuffled. The adversary only knows that these blocks are untouched, but cannot determine the plaintext
identity. However, for the
√
N touched blocks, the server can identify the exact order for which they were
queried. When KCacheShuffleBasic executes, the adversary is unable to distinguish whether any resulting
block was previously touched and/or untouched. Therefore, future queries remain hidden from the adversary
and this argument remains identical after every execution of KCacheShuffleBasic.
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(a) Required client storage for CacheShuffleRoot. (b) Client storage over trials for CacheShuffleRoot.
Figure 2: Client Storage of CacheShuffleRoot.
9.3 Hierarchical ORAMs
In the work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [6], they presented the first polylog overhead Oblivious RAM
algorithm. Further work by Ostrovsky and Shoup [17], improved the worst case overhead. In both schemes,
an oblivious shuffle is required to permute data blocks randomly in a manner hidden from the adversarial
server. Furthermore, a constant fraction of the data blocks are dummies whose values can be arbitrary.
Therefore, by using KCacheShuffleDummy, we improve the hidden constants by at least 5x compared to
constructions which use the MelbourneShuffle.
10 Experiments
In this section, we empirically investigate the hidden constants of CacheShuffle. We first investigate the neces-
sary client storage of CacheShuffleRoot for various parameters. Also, the performance of KCacheShuffleDummy
is compared to KCacheShuffleBasic for handling dummy blocks.
10.1 Client Storage of CacheShuffleRoot
We consider multiple instantiations of CacheShuffleRoot with various parameters of . Each instance is
executed over one million blocks of data. From Figure 2a, we see that both the max and mean cache
sizes exponentially decrease as  increases. Also, the max and mean cache sizes do not differ significantly.
Furthermore, we run each instance of CacheShuffleRoot on one million blocks over multiple trials and record
the max cache size encountered. It turns out the max cache size is reached fairly quickly and does not change
as the number of trials increase (see Figure 2b).
10.2 Bandwidth Comparison of CacheShuffleRoot and MelbourneShuffle
In these experiments, we will investigate the hidden constants of CacheShuffleRoot and compare them with
the MelbourneShuffle when K = N . Asymptotically, both algorithms require O(
√
N) blocks of client storage
and O(N) blocks of bandwidth. For practical use cases, the hidden constants are important. For example,
the constants affect the costs that cloud service providers must consider for their products. To provide
a fair comparison, we will ensure to pick parameters such that CacheShuffle uses the same client storage
as the Melbourne Shuffle. The Melbourne Shuffle requires O(
√
N) client storage. Therefore, we can use
CacheShuffle√K, since K = N with some small  > 0.
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Using crude analysis of the hidden constants, we already know that MelbourneShuffle requires (10 + c)N
blocks of bandwidth and some c = Θ(1). On the other hand, CacheShuffleRoot uses only (4 + )N blocks of
bandwidth, for small . In both algorithms, c and  are directly related with the bandwidth as well as the
hidden constants of the required client storage. We attempt to quantify c and  for practical data sizes and
a fixed number of blocks of client storage.
Our experiments run both CacheShuffleRoot and MelbourneShuffle using the same input and output
permutations. Furthermore, we assume that exactly
√
N blocks of client storage are available. It turns
out that  < 1 is sufficient for CacheShuffleRoot, while c ≥ 8 is required for MelbourneShuffle. Therefore,
CacheShuffleRoot is at least a 4x improvement over MelbourneShuffle. A comparison of the performances
can be seen in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Comparison of CacheShuffleRoot and MelbourneShuffle.
Let us also consider
√
N -Oblivious Shuffling. Again, MelbourneShuffle requires (10+c)N blocks of band-
width. On the other hand, KCacheShuffleBasic requires exactly 2N blocks of bandwidth. So, KCacheShuffleBasic
is a 9x improvement for practical sizes of N .
10.3 Bandwidth of KCacheShuffleDummy
We investigate the bandwidth costs of KCacheShuffleDummy in a scenario with dummy blocks. For conve-
nience, we assume that there are N + D input blocks and N + D output blocks. We assume that D = N ,
that is half the blocks are dummies. Using KCacheShuffleBasic, we know that 2(N + D) = 4N blocks of
bandwidth are required. On the other hand, KCacheShuffleDummy only uses D + (2 + )N = (3 + )N
for some small . Using experiments, we show that  is very small for practical data sizes (see Figure 4).
Furthermore, as the number of blocks increase,  decreases.
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Figure 4: Bandwidth of KCacheShuffleDummy.
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A Revisiting MelbourneShuffle
The notion of Oblivious Shuffling was first introduced in [16], which introduced the Melbourne Shuffle. The
Melbourne Shuffle required O(N) blocks of bandwidth and only O(
√
N) client memory. We show that their
security notion is an N -Oblivious Shuffle.
We recall the original oblivious shuffle security definition. We show that Oblivious Shuffle is exactly
N -Oblivious Shuffling under the assumption that Enc is IND-CPA secure. Specifically, it is assumed in the
original Oblivious Shuffling notion that the adversary knows the entirety of pi, the input allocation map.
Definition A.1 (Shuffle-IND). For challenger C with shuffle algorithm Sh and adversary A, we define game
ShuffleIndGameShA (N,λ) as follows
1. A sends {Bi, pii, σi}i∈[l] to C where l = poly(λ).
2. C sends {pii(Enc(K,Bi)), transi}i∈[l] to A where each transi is picked according to T Sh(pii, σi).
3. A submits distinct (C0, ρ0, ρ′0) and (C1, ρ1, ρ′1) to A as the challenge.
4. C random selects b ← {0, 1}. C sends {ρb(Enc(K,Cb)), trans} to A where trans is drawn according
to T Sh(ρb, ρ′b).
5. Repeat Steps 1-2.
6. A outputs b′.
Output 1 iff b = b′.
Definition A.2 (Shuffle-IND Secure). Suppose that Sh is a shuffling algorithm over N = poly(k) items.
Then, Sh is Shuffle-IND secure if for every probabilistically polynomial-time bounded adversary A
Pr[ShuffleIndGameShA (N,λ) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(N).
Theorem A.1. Sh is Shuffle-IND secure if and only if Sh is an Oblivious Shuffle.
Proof. We compare the two games ShuffleIndGame and OSGame with an N -restricted adversary. That is,
we are allowing A to pick the entirety of the input permutations for OSGame. If we remove steps 1-2 and 5
from ShuffleIndGame, the games are identical. However, we see that A can simulate steps 1-2 and 5 without
the help of C since Sh is known to A. Therefore, the games are identical.
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B CacheShuffleRoot Pseudocode
CacheShuffleRoot 1 Oblivious Shuffling with O(
√
N) client storage.
Input: pi, σ,Source,Dest
Set ν ← √K and ξ ← (1 + /2)√K.
Set cnt← 0 and cntν ← 1.
Initialize srcInd1, . . . , srcIndν to be empty on the client.
for all i ∈ Touched do
Set srcIndcntν ← srcIndcntν ∪ {i}.
Increment cnt by 1.
if cnt =
√
K then
Set cnt← 0.
Increment cntν by 1.
end if
end for
Initialize dMap to be an empty key-value storage.
Initialize destB1, . . . , destBξ to be empty on the client.
for all i ∈ [N ] do
Choose j uniformly at random from [ξ].
Set destBj ← destBj ∪ {i}.
Set dMap[i]← j.
end for
Initialize Q1, . . . ,Qξ to be empty maps on the client.
Initialize temp1, . . . , tempξ to be empty on the server with p empty slots for blocks each.
for i = 1, . . . , ν do
Run Spray(pi, σ, dMap,Source, srcIndi,Q1, . . . ,Qξ, temp1, . . . , tempξ).
end for
for i = 1, . . . , ξ do
Run Recalibrate(pi, σ,Source,Dest, destBi,Qi, tempi).
end for
Spray 2 The Spray phase of CacheShuffleRoot.
Input: pi, σ, dMap,Source, srcInd,Q1, . . . ,Qξ, temp1, . . . , tempξ
for all i ∈ srcInd do
Download Source[pi(i)].
Set Bi ← Dec(key,Source[pi(i)]).
Set posi ← dMap[σ(i)].
Set Qposi [σ(i)]← Bi.
end for
for i = 1, . . . , ξ do
if Qi 6= ∅ then
Remove any element B from Qi.
Upload Enc(key, B) to tempi.
else
Upload Enc(key,0) to tempi.
end if
end for
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Recalibrate 3 The Recalibrate phase of CacheShuffleRoot.
Input: pi, σ,Source,Dest, destB,Q, temp
Download temp from the server.
for all blocks B ∈ temp do
Set B ← Enc(key, B).
Set Q[σ(B.idx)]← B.
end for
for all j ∈ destB do
Upload Enc(key,Q[j]) to destB[j].
Remove Q[j].
end for
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C KCacheShuffleBasic Pseudocode
KCacheShuffleBasic 4 K-Oblivious Shuffle with O(K) client storage.
Input: pi, σ,Source,Dest,Touched
Initialize tbDown← [N ].
Initialize U to be an empty map on the client.
for all i ∈ Touched do
Download B ← Source[pi(i)].
Set U[i]← Dec(key, B).
Set tbDown← tbDown / {pi(i)}.
end for
for i = 1, . . . , N do
if i ≤ N −K then
if σ−1(i) /∈ tbDown then
Pick j uniformly at random from tbDown.
Download B ← Source[pi(j)].
Set U[j]← Dec(key, B).
Set tbDown← tbDown / {j}.
else
Download B ← Source[pi(σ−1(i))].
Set U[σ−1(i)]← Dec(key, B).
Set tbDown← tbDown / {σ−1(i)}.
end if
end if
Upload Enc(key,U[σ−1(i)]) to Dest[i].
end for
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D KCacheShuffleDummy Pseudocode
KCacheShuffleDummy 5 K-Oblivious Shuffle including dummies with O(K) client storage.
Input: pi, σ,Source,Dest,Touched
Initialize tbDown← [M ].
Initialize U to be an empty map on the client.
for all i ∈ Touched do
Download B ← Source[pi(i)] to client memory.
Set U[i]← Dec(key, B).
Set tbDown← tbDown / {i}.
end for
Initialize destB1, . . . , destBp to be empty on client memory.
for i = 1, . . . ,M do
Pick r uniformly at random from [p].
Set destBr ← destBr ∪ {i}.
end for
for i = 1, . . . , p do
if |destBi| > (1 + )K then
Abort algorithm and fail.
else if |{d ∈ destBi : σ(d) 6=⊥}| > (1 + )ρK then
Abort algorithm and fail.
end if
for all d ∈ destBi do
if d ∈ tbDown then
Download B ← Source[pi(d)].
Set U[d]← Dec(key, B).
Set tbDown← tbDown / {d}.
else
if tbDown 6= ∅ then
Pick r uniformly at random from tbDown.
Download B ← Source[pi(r)].
Set U[r]← Dec(key, B).
Set tbDown← tbDown / {r}.
end if
end if
end for
Construct f(x) such that f(σ(d)) = Enc(key,U[d]), for all d ∈ destBi.
Client sends server the coefficients of f(x) and destB′i ← σ(destBi).
for all x ∈ destB′i do
Server places f(x) in location Dest[x].
end for
end for
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